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Auction Design and Tacit Collusion
in FCC Spectrum Auctions
Patrick Bajari and Jungwon Yeo
October 19, 2008
Abstract
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum
since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions
rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the
actions of bidders less visible during the auction and also limit the set of bids which can
be submitted by a bidder during a particular round. Economic theory suggests that
tacit collusion may be more di¢ cult as a result. We examine this proposition using data
from 4 auctions: the PCS C Block, Auction 35, the Advanced Wireless Service auction
and the 700 Mhz auction. We examine the frequency of jump bids, retaliatory bids and
straightforward bids across these auctions. While this simple descriptive exercise has a
number of limitations, the data suggests that these rule changes did limit rms ability to
tacitly collude.
Bajari: Univeristy of Minnesota and NBER, Yeo: Univeristy of Minnesota. Bajari would like to thank the
National Science Foundation for generous research support.
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1 Introduction
Starting in 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award
spectrum. Prior to this time, the FCC used administrative hearings or lotteries to award
licenses. Economic theory suggests that auctions should have a number of advantages over
these earlier mechanisms. First, in many auction models, game theory predicts that the bidder
which values the item most highly will win the auction. Therefore, the auction results in an
e¢ cient allocation. Second, auctions generate higher revenues than lotteries or administrative
hearings by making rms pay for the right to own licenses. We note that the most recent
700 MHz auction generated $19.1 billion dollars in revenues. Finally, auctions have clear and
transparent rules for awarding licenses. This minimizes the possibility for corruption and
economizes on ine¢ cient inuence costs from persuading administrative boards.
Over the past decade, a large theoretical literature on spectrum auctions has emerged (See
Milgrom (2004) for an excellent survey). An important, but often ignored, aspect of auction
design is preventing collusion among bidders (see Marshall and Marx (2007)). Auctions have
highly transparent information about both prices and quantities which facilitates the ability of
colluders to monitor each othersactions and punish deviations from collusive agreements. For
example, in the PCS C-Block auction (Auction 5), bidders submitted roughly 30,000 bids in 183
rounds. The bid amounts and the identity of the bidders where publically observable during
the course of the auction. Avery (1998) demonstrated that jump bids may soften competition
in ascending auctions serving as a tool to signal bidder valuations. Brusco and Lopomo (2002)
characterize collusive equilibria which can be sustained with biddersability to observe their
opponentsdeviation from collusive behavior.1
Since the rst spectrum auctions in 1994, the FCC has modied the auction rules in ways
might make it more di¢ cult for bidders to tacitly collude.2 First, in auction 16 the FCC
introduced click box bidding. Under these rules, the bidders are allowed to increase their bids
by xed increments. Bidders were given 9 possible bid increments from which to choose. Click
box bidding limits the opportunities for jump bidding. In a given round, they were allowed
to increase their bid by at most 90 percent. Also, click box bidding makes code bidding
more di¢ cult. In auction 11 (the DEF block), bidders were allowed to freely choose their
1Ausubel and Cramton (1998) consider demand reduction as a strategy that softens competition. We do not
di¤erentiate demand reduction from collusive behavior explicitely although implementation of the strategy of
demand reduction does not involve coordination among bidders in contrast to tacit collusion.
2The FCC adopted explicit anti-collusion rules that prohibits bidders that applied for common markets from
collaborating, discussing or disclosing their bidding strategy. The rules also requre participants to identify
any parties with whom they entered into consortium arrangements, joint ventures and any explicit or implicit
agreements. While this anti-collusion rule concerns bidding cartel, we focus on changes in auctions rules that
concerns tacit collusion.
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bid. In many cases, their bids included 7 or more gures and the tailing digits were used to
communicate their intentions to rivals. For example, if a bidder intended to vigorously defend
license 451, it might include 451 as the last 3 digits of at the end of its bids. This is obviously
mechanically impossible using click box bidding.
A second rule change is anonymous bidding which was introduced in the 700 MHz auction.
In anonymous bidding, the identities of the bidders is no longer publically observed. This
limits the ability of a rm to retaliate against rivals for bidding on its preferred licenses. Game
theoretic models of collusion, such as Greene and Porter (1984) frequently require the threat
of retaliation from the collusive agreement in order to sustain collusion in equilibrium. If it
is more di¢ cult to monitor the actions of other bidders, it will be more di¢ cult to sustain
collusive equilibrium via retaliation.
A third rule change regards the size of minimum opening bids. The presence of relatively
large minimum opening bids increases the possibility of overpaying or a risk of a nancial loss
when bidders bid on licenses that they do not desire to explore chances to reduce their payment
by gamining the auction format. One example of such behavior is called parkingwhich refers
to the bidding behavior of delaying bidding for licenses they desire until late rounds to soften
competion over those licenses.
In this paper, we examine bids from 4 di¤erent spectrum auctions. Our research goal is to
examine the relationship between changes in the rules and the frequency of anti-competitive
bidding strategies. The auctions include the PCS C Block, Auction 35, the Advanced Wireless
Service auction and the 700 MHz auction. These auctions are the largest in terms of revenue
generated and took place between 1994 and 2008. As a result, we see a variety of di¤erent
rules used by the FCC, which di¤er in their susceptibility to collusion. We will examine the
frequency of jump bids, the proportion of bids that are straightforwardand we will search
for evidence of retaliatory bids.
If we observe fewer collusive strategies, this suggests that the rule changes may have
made it more di¢ cult for rms to collude. Of course, given the available data, our methods
do not allow us to directly test for the frequency of collusion. The items sold and the cellular
industry also varied in addition to the auction rules over this time period. Also, there is not
a well worked out equilibrium theory for how the rules changes inuence equilibrium bidding.
Obviously, what we can learn from this simple, descriptive exercise is limited as a result.
Nevertheless, we believe that this systematic examination of the data is valuable. First,
a descriptive examination of the bids is often a rst step to theorizing about richer models.
We note that some of the empirical bidding patterns we observe are not easily rationalized
by any existing economic theory. Second, despite its limitations, it may be of use to policy
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making. In practice, policy makers design auctions with imperfect knowledge of the strategies
that bidders will use and in particular, if they will collude. Simple descriptive evidence, despite
its limitations, can serve as a basis for future discussions about auction designs that will take
place between regulatory agencies, bidders and academics.
2 Auction Rules
In this section, we describe the rules for bidding in the spectrum auctions. We begin by
describing the basic structure of the auction including the structure of the rounds and the
activity rules. Next, we describe some modications of the rules that were made to inhibit
collusion, including click box bidding and anonymous bidding.
2.1 Simultaneous Ascending Auction Rules
The FCC spectrum auctions use the simultaneous ascending format. In a typical auction,
there are many heterogenous licenses for sale. In a particular round, rms may submit bids
on any of the licenses in the auction over the Internet using FCC Auction System. The length
of a round is announced in advance. In the 700 MHz auction, for example, rounds lasted 30
minutes. The number of rounds per day is one or two in the early stage but increases to several
rounds, for example six (AWS-1) to 14 (700 MHz), in the late stage. At the end of the round,
the bids for each license including the identities of the bidders were announced (except for the
700 MHz auction which had anonymous bidding). All bids in round r + 1 were required to
exceed the high standing bid in round r plus a bid increment. The auction continued until no
new bids were received, which lasted up to 6 months in the case of Auction 5. At the end of
the nal round, the highest bidder on each licenses was awarded the licenses at the price it bid.
In order to keep the auction moving, the FCC imposes activity rules under which the FCC
restricts the bidders ability to bid in subsequent rounds, called eligibility, upon violation. For
all four auctions in our data set, the eligibility of a bidder in round r+1 was calculated by the
following formula
eligibility in round r + 1 = min(eligibility in round r,
activity in round r
requirement percentage in r
) (1)
A bidders activity in round r is equal to the size of the licenses for which she is active,
that is, she is either the high standing bidder from the previous round or places a bid on the
licenses in round r: The size of each license is measured in terms of bidding units which are
typically determined by the licenses Pop-MHz, the product of the population and the size of
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the bandwidth. The requirement percentage in r describes the percentage of bidderseligibility
above which each bidder should be active. It is determined by the FCC during the course of
an auction. In the C Block (Auction 5) for example, the requirement percentage was .6 in the
early rounds and was raised to .8 and then to .95 in later rounds. The auction rules required
that a bidders eligibility was at least as large as the size of the licenses she bid on. If a
bidder lost eligibility between rounds, this would limit the set of licenses that she could bid on.
These activity rules therefore gave incentives to the bidders with the highest valuations to bid
aggressively during the auction.
2.2 Click Box bidding
In auctions 1-15, bidders manually typed their bids into a eld which appeared on the bid
submission screen on FCC Auction System. Manually typing in the bids created several
problems. First, rms could make typing errors, for example, several bidders mistakenly
included extra zeros in their bids, inadvertently increasing their bid amounts by a factor of
10! Fortunately, the FCC allowed for bid withdrawals which allowed rms recourse if they
inadvertently submitted an incorrect bid. Table 1 summarizes the bid withdrawal rules in our
4 auctions.
Second, and more importantly, manually typing bids allowed rms to engage in code bidding.
Cramton and Schwartz (2002) document this behavior in the PCS D, E, and F block auction
(Auction 11). Some participants incorporated three-digit market numbers, corresponding to
license numbers, into the last digits of some of bids as a means of sending a message to their
opponents. For example, the bidder High Plains led an Emergency Motion for Disqualication,
alleging that the bidder Mercury engaged in this anticompetitive behavior. Code bidding could
allow bidders to tacitly collude by signalling their most preferred licenses in order to allocate
licenses among a cartel without driving up nal bids. Also, this strategy could allow bidders
to threaten retaliation and hence enforce cartel agreements.
Motivated by these problems, the FCC has used click box bidding since Auction 16. Under
click box bidding, bidders are provided with a xed menu of acceptable bids. In the ASW-1
and Auction 35, for example bidders were o¤ered a menu of 9 bids. The smallest bid was the
minimum bid increment plus the highest bid from the previous round. The other additional
acceptable bids were determined by multiplying the minimum acceptable bid by successively
larger numbers such as 1.1, 1.2, and so on, rounded. The largest bid was typically 80 to 90
percent larger than the standing bid from the previous round depending on the pace of the
auction. The rules for click box bidding are also summarized in Table 1.
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2.3 Information Disclosure
The FCC used the Full Information Disclosure Procedures in its auction rules until the 700
MHz auction. Under these procedures, the FCC posted the bids placed by each bidder on each
license, the identity of the bidder, and the change in each bidders eligibility. Economic theory
suggests that collusion is easier to enforce rms in markets that are highly transparent because
it is easier to punish deviators from collusive arrangements. Anecdotal evidence on retaliating
bids are abundant. For example, in the AWS-1 auction, T-Mobile placed a bid only once on
Columbia, MO (BEA098) throughout the auction in round 117. It was right after Cavalier
Wireless had bid on Hawaii (REAG008) for which T-Mobile had been the standing high bidder
since round 55. Cavalier Wireless had been the standing high bidder on Columbia, MO since
round 62 until it was challenged by T-Mobile in round 117. While placing a retaliatory bid
on Columbia, MO, T-Mobile also placed a bid on Hawaii in round 117 to reclaim it. Cavalier
also placed a new bid on Columbia, MO in round 118 to reclaim it and has never placed a bid
on Hawaii since then. Bajari and Fox (2007) also provide anecdotes on retaliatory bids in the
PCS C block auction.
In response to concerns about potential collusion, the FCC considered limiting the amount
of publically available information in the AWS-1 auction. Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate
stated that:
There has been much debate about whether, and to what extent, tacit collusion,
or the opportunity for collusion and other anti-competitive behavior, exists in our
current AWS auction rules. Some of the nest scholars have cautioned us that our
rules allow may even invite such anti-competitive behavior. Economic experts
and authors have written articles that support such conclusion and describe how
easily bidders can gameauctions under our current rules. 
However, the FCC applied the usual full information procedures to the AWS-1 auction the
gauge it used to measure of the likely level of competition turned out to be above the pre-
specied level.3 In the 700 MHz auction, the FCC used anonymous bidding, that is it only
posted the standing high bid for each license after each round. The identity of the bidder, the
bid amounts other than the standing high bid, and the initial level and changes of each bidders
eligibility were not revealed until the auction ended. 4
3The FCC announced that if the ratio of the sum of all the bidders initial eligibility, subject to the cap,
to the sum of bidding units of all the licenses o¤ered for sale, is equal to or greater than 3, it would conduct
AWS-1 under Full Information Disclosure Procedures. The ratio turned out 3:04.
4The Public Interest Spectrum Coalition (PISC) along with Verizon and Google agreed with the FCCs
decision. Other bidders, including MetroPCS, argued that anonymous bidding would hurt small rms because
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Table 1: Auction Rules
Minimum Click box bidding # of rounds
Auction opening (Number of
Anonymous
withdrawals
Package Activity
bids acceptable bids)a
bidding
allowed
bidding requirement
700Mhz X X (1,3)b X X (2)c X 80%! 95%
AWS-1 X X (9)  X (2)  80%! 95%
Auction 35 X X (9)  X (2)  80%! 90%! 98%
PCS C block    X(No Limit)  60%! 80%! 95%
a the number of acceptable bids that the FCC provided for each license per round. b For C block
licenses, three acceptable bids for individual licenses and one acceptable bid for package bidding. c
for the licenses subject to package bidding, bidders were allowed to drop non-provisionally winning
bids no more than in one round
2.4 Minimum opening bids
For early auctions, including the original three PCS auctions, the minimum opening bid for
each license was zero. The lack of a minimum bid may have lead to a strategy called parking
in which a bidder bid on many licenses that it is not interested in purchasing just to maintain
its eligibility. Salant (1997) documented this behavior based on his experience as a consultant
for GTE in the PCS A&B block auction. He argues that the GTE bidding team engaged in
parking in earlier rounds in order to obfuscate the licenses that GTE most valued and to lower
the nal prices on these licenses.
There is no evidence or theory which directly suggest that minimum bids are relevant for
the study of collusion in these auctions. However, this was a potentially important rule change
will will a¤ect the interpretation of our empirical results.
The FCC has also limited the number of bid withdrawals that can be made during an
auction since Auction 16. Instances of bid withdrawals following retaliatory bids in Auction 11
were documented in Cramton and Schwartz (2000). The FCC admits that this change was to
ensure that bidders do not take advantage of bid withdrawals for strategic advantage.
3 Four Auctions
The data used in this paper comes from 4 auctions, the PCS C block (Auction 5), the C Block
Reauction (Auction 35), the AWS-1 auction and the 700 MHz auction. In this section, we
briey describe the items sold in each of these auctions and some summary statistics about the
they rely on the identity of other bidders to provide assurance to their nanciers regarding market valuations.
Peter Cramton in a letter submitted on the behalf of AT&T also argues that anonymous bidding would hurt
e¢ ciency. Alltel proposed that the FCC should at least reveal the changes in each bidders eligibility after every
round.
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Table 2: AWS-1 and 700MHz
No. of licenses Total Pop-MHz No. of qualied Net price perAuction Year
o¤ered (sold) o¤ered (sold)a bidders
Revenue(B)
Pop-MHz
700Mhz 2008 1099 (1090) 17.708 (14.833) 214 18.958 1.278
AWS-1 2006 1122 (1087) 25.706 (25.539) 168 13.700 0.536
Auction 35 2000 422 (422) 4.029 87 16.957 4.184
PCS C block 1995 493 (493) 7.577 255 10.071 1.330
a in billions.
winning bids and bidders. In table 2 below, we summarize some key statistics about our 4
auctions including the date of the auctions, the number of licenses, the Pop-MHz, the revenue
and the number of bidders.
3.1 PCS C Block
The C block auction was the fth spectrum auction FCC conducted. The auction was intended
to allocate rights to provide a variety of communication services referred to as Broadband PCS
for ten years. The FCC allocated spectrum ranging from 1850-1910 MHz and 1930-1990 MHz
and divided this 120 MHz of spectrum into six frequency blocks A through F. Blocks A, B and
C are 30 megahertz and blocks D, E, and F are 10 MHz each. To dene coverage of spectrum
licenses in the C block, the FCC used the map of Basic Trading Area (BTA) that divides the
US and its territories into 493 areas.
In the C block auction, 255 qualied bidders participated, of which 89 bidders won 493
licenses resulting in $10.1 billion dollars of revenue. The C block auction started in December
1995 and ended in May 1996 after round 184. The C block was designated for bidders who
had revenues for the 3 years preceding the auction less than $40 million and hence were given a
bidding credit of 25%. The C block auction is considered more competitive than the other two
broadband PCS auctions. The (population-weighted) average price was $1.33 per Pop-MHz in
the C Block compared to $0.5 and only $0.33 per Pop-MHz in the AB and the DEF auctions
respectively.5 Table 3 summarizes the top 5 bidders in the C Block auction. The largest
bidder was NextWave, winning a total of 37.14% of the total Pop-MHz in the auction. The
bidders in the auction were quite asymmetric. The 5 largest bidders won 68 percent fo the
total spectrum. The 5 largest bidders paid $1.548 per Pop-MHz compared to the remaining
bidders who paid $0.846. This discrepancy is due in part to the fact that the largest bidders
were awarded licenses in largest and most a­ uent U.S. cities.
5The average price $1.33 per MHz pop of the block C auction drops to about $0.8 per MHZ pop after
adjusting for the terms of the installment payments available to the small businesses that won C block licenses.
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Table 3: Winning Bidders in PCS C Block
Share of Net PriceBidder Name Pop-Mhza
Total Pop-MHz
Net Paymentb
per Pop-MHzc
NextWave 2.81 37:14% 4.201 1.493
DCR 1.01 13:28% 1.427 1.418
GWI 0.54 7:11% 1.060 1.968
BDPCS 0.46 6:13% 0.874 1.882
Omnipoint 0.39 5:13% 0.509 1.309
Top 5 5.21 68:79% 0.807 1.548
Others 2.36 31:21% 2.001 0.846
Total 7.58 10.072 1.330
a in billions. b in billion dollars. c in dollars.
Today, only a handful of C block winners, such as GWI/Metro PCS, are independent
carriers. Most of the winning C block bidders merged with larger carriers (forming a large
part of licenses held by T-Mobile USA, for example). Other C Block winners sold or defaulted
on their licences. Defaulting bidders included BDPCS who won 17 licenses including Seattle,
Phoenix, Minneapolis and Denver and Omnipoint who defaulted on 14 licenses it won in the C
block. The largest defaulter in the FCC auction history was NextWave. However, NextWave
was able to protect some of its licenses in bankruptcy court and eventually sold them to other
carriers. For example, NextWave sold its licenses in 23 markets including 20 MHz licenses for
New York and Boston to Verizon for $3.0 billion.
3.2 Auction 35
The returned or canceled PCS licenses were reauctioned via several auctions. Auction No.
35 o¤ered licenses in the C block and the F block, originally sold in Auction No. 5 (PCS
C block) and Auction No. 11 (PCS D, E, and F blocks) including licenses reclaimed from
bankrupt NextWave. Auction 35 began on 12/12/2000 and closed on 1/26/2001. 87 bidders
participated and 35 bidders won 422 licenses after 101 rounds over 24 days. Small businesses
were given a bidding credit of 15% or 25% on C and F block licenses won in Auction No. 35.
Certain C and F block licenses were only available to entrepreneurs in closedbidding.6 Table
6In order to qualify as an entrepreneur, an applicant, including attributable investors and a¢ liates, must
have had gross revenue of less than $125 million in each of the last two years and must have less than $500 million
in total assets. A law suit agains AT&T was led after the auction for using a bidding front Alaska Wireless
to bid on licenses reserved for small and minority-owned businesses and acquire bidding credits intended only
for those businesses. Cramton and et al (2008) studies the e¤ect of having AT&T in the competion for licenses
set aside designated entities. They conclude AT&Ts presence caused an increase in price of roughly $1.15 per
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Table 4: Major winning bidders in Auction 35
Share of Net (Net) PriceBidder Name Pop-Mhza
Total Pop-MHz Paymentb per Pop-MHzc
Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless 1.52 37.67% 8.78 5.79 (5.79)
Salmon PCS, LLC 0.74 18.37% 2.35 3.93 (3.17)
Alaska Native Wireless, L.L.C. 0.65 16.11% 2.89 4.56 (4.46)
Leap Wireless International, Inc. 0.20 4.97% 0.35 1.92 (1.75)
DCC PCS, Inc. 0.18 4.49% 0.55 3.02 (3.02)
sum of top 5 3.29 81.62% 14.92 4.74 (4.54)
others 0.74 18.38% 1.94 2.72 (2.62)
total 4.03 16.86 4.37 (4.18)
a in billons. b in billion dollars. c in dollars.
4 summarizes the bids of the top 5 bidders in the auction. As in the C block, the bidders were
quite asymmetric with the top 5 bidders winning 81% of the total Pop-MHz. Note that the
price of Pop-MHz was on average $4.37 ($4.18 in net), a substantial increase over the original
auction prices for these licenses $2.01 ($1.51 in net) without adjusting for ination. Bids for the
majority of licenses at Auction 35 were eventually canceled as NextWave protected its licenses
under federal bankruptcy law.
3.3 AWS-1 and 700 MHz
The ASW auction was held in 2006 and o¤ered 1122 licenses for sale, of which 1087 were
sold. The licenses in this auction could be used for a variety of wireless services including
Third Generation (3G) mobile broadband and advanced wireless services for voice and data.
The FCC allocated spectrum ranging from 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz for AWS-1 and
divided this 80 MHz of spectrum into six frequency blocks A through F. Blocks A, B and F were
20 MHz and blocks C, D and E are 10 MHz. To dene coverage of spectrum licenses in Block
A, the FCC used maps of Cellular Market Area (CMA) which divides the US and its territories
into 734 areas. For blocks other than A, Basic Economic Area and Regional Economic Area
Grouping are used to dene coverage of spectrum licenses.
The 700 MHz auction began on 1/24/2008 and ended on 3/18/2008. There were 1099
licenses for sale of which 1090 eventually sold. In the auction, 214 bidders were qualied
to participate of which 101 bidders won 1090 licenses. Ultimately, 9 licenses, including the
nationwide D block license, were unsold. The 700 MHz auction o¤ered licenses to use 698-806
MHz band which is currently owned by broadcasters for analog television which will be turned
MHz Pop, or 58% of the nal prices of closed licenses.
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Table 5: Winning Bidders in AWS-1 and 700MHz
AWS-1
T-Mobile SpectrumCo Verizon Cingular Top 4 Others
Pop-MHz(B) 6.64 5.27 3.84 2.44 18.18 7.36
Net payment(B) 4.18 2.38 2.81 1.33 10.70 3.00
Price per Pop-MHz 0.63 0.45 0.73 0.55 0.59 0.41
Total Purchasea 25.83% 20.49% 14.94% 9.48% 70.74% 29.26%
700MHz
Verizon AT&T Frontier Top 3 Others
Pop-MHz(B) 9.36 2.11 1.30 11.92 2.91
Net payment(B) 8.51 6.64 0.712 16.72 2.25
Price per Pop-MHz 1.10 3.15 0.55 1.40 0.77
Total Purchasea 57.36% 14.22% 8.79% 80.37% 19.65%
a relative to the total Pop-MHz sold.
over to the government in 2009. These lower frequencies travel farther and penetrate solids
better compared to higher frequencies. Those properties of lower frequencies make them more
cost e¢ cient for uses for wireless service. According to the Congressional Research Service,
one access point in a 700MHz network can cover the same area as four access points in a 2.4
GHz network. Some industry analysts argued that this auction could transform the wireless
broadband landscape in the US as a result.
Table 5 shows the four biggest winners in the AWS-1. The four biggest winners accounted
for 71% of the total units of Pop-MHz sold and 78% of the total revenue. T-mobile was
the biggest bidder accounting for 25:99% of the total amount of Pop-MHz sold. The table
also shows the three biggest winners in the 700MHz auction. Verizon purchased 57% of the
total Pop-MHz sold including the 8 C block licenses which are subject to the open access
requirements.
4 Overview of Bidding Behavior
In this section, we provide a basic description of how the bids evolve over the course of the
auction. In particular, we describe how bidder eligibility and the number of remaining bidders
evolves from early to late rounds. This allows us to graphically study the speed of the
auction. We shall also discuss how the speed of the auction is inuenced by reserve prices.
4.1 Eligibility
Figure 1 graphs changes of bidderseligibility in our four auctions. The vertical axis is dened
at the ratio of two terms. The numerator is the sum of all bidders eligibility. The denom-
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Figure 1: Changes in eligibility ratio over rounds
inator is the number of bidding units required to purchase all of the licenses in the auction.
The horizontal axis in this gure is the round in the auction. Notice that bidder eligibility,
as measured by the vertical axis declines monotonically over the course of the auction and
eventually converges to one. Eligibility summed over all bidders will decline as a consequence
of equation (1). As the rounds progress, the bids will increase and some bidders will no longer
continue to bid on a particular license. This decision not to bid will result in a loss of eligibility
of a subset of the bidders. This process will continue until, by the rules of the auction, there
is just enough eligibility for the remaining bidders to purchase the available licenses.
Recall from Table 1 that minimum bids were not used in the PCS C block. Auction 35 had
minimum bids, but these were quite low compared to the nal prices. The sum of the minimum
bids divided by the sum of the nal prices was 0.026. In the AWS-1 and 700 MHz auctions,
the reserve prices were considerably higher compared to the nal prices. The analogous sum
in these auctions was 0.084 and 0.104. Figure 1 suggests that the level of the minimum bids
signicantly inuenced the pace of the auction and participation, and could help explain why
the sum of biddersinitial eligibility was lower in AWS-1 and the 700 MHz auctions than in
the two earlier auctions.
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Figure 2: Number of Qualied bidders
4.2 Number of Bidders
Figure 2 graphs the number of bidders in our 4 auctions. The vertical access is the number
of active bidders remaining in the auction and the horizontal axis is the round of the auction.
The number of active bidders decreases monotonically over time as bidder eligibility decreases.
As the rounds in an auction increase, the standing prices on each of the licenses will go up.
A subset of the bidders will choose not to bid at the higher standing prices and will therefore
lose eligibility as illustrated in 1. As their eligibility drops towards zero, such bidders will be
forced to leave the auction as illustrated in 2.
Analogous to gure 2, the reserve prices seem to have a strong inuence on bidding activity
early in the auction. In the PCS C block and Auction 35 where reserve prices were low, more
bidders participated with large eligibility, but the percentage decrease in bidders is much larger
than in the later AWS-1 and 700 MHz auctions.
Obviously, we are not able to draw a direct causal link between the reserve prices and the
evolution of eligibility and the number of bidders over the course of the auction. We are not able
to control for all factors which inuence bidding decisions in such a simple gure. Nonetheless,
the di¤erences in the reserve prices is certainly a leading explanation for di¤erences in the speed
of the various auctions.
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5 Collusive Bidding
In this nal section, we study the relationship between the rules of the auction and the frequency
of potentially collusive bidding strategies. As we discussed in the introduction, it is not
possible to directly test for tacit collusion using simple, descriptive methods for two reasons.
First, economic theory does not give clear guidance on how to distinguish collusive from non-
collusive strategies in many simple models. Spectrum auctions are extremely complicated,
making it even more di¢ cult to theoretically characterize collusive from non-collusive bidding.
Second, there is the problem of omitted variables. The characteristics of the licenses and
the industry is changing across our sample in ways that we cannot directly control for in our
analysis. The latent factors certainly explain some part of bidding behavior and we are not
taking account of them in our analysis.
Despite these limitations and with these caveats, we still believe it is useful to examine how
bidding di¤ers across auctions. Simple, descriptive analysis is often a rst step towards better
theoretical and econometric models. Also, policy makers cannot wait until denitive theoretical
or empirical work in economics is completed, if such work is ever available. In applied policy
work, decisions must be made with incomplete and imperfect information. Simple, descriptive
evidence is often combined with a broader understanding of the industry, economic theory and
public feedback to determine future changes to the auction mechanism.
5.1 Straightforward Bidding
The concept of straightforward bidding is discussed in Milgrom (2000, 2004). Bidders bid
straightforwardly if, at each round, they place the minimum bid on the additional licenses
they would wish to acquire if the auction were to end after the round, but are not provision-
ally winning at the moment. Straightforward bidding is feasible if and only if licenses are
substitutes.7 Straightforward bidding has played an important role in theoretical models of
spectrum auctions. For example, Milgrom (2000) demonstrates that if licenses are substitutes
and bidders bid straightforwardly, then the nal allocation of licenses will resemble a compet-
itive equilibrium allocation. The straightforward bidding behavior does not permit collusive
behavior.
We begin therefore by exploring the frequency of straightforward bids across our four auc-
tions. Two obvious cases of non-straightforward bids are jump bids and self bumping bids.
We dene a jump bid as a bid that is greater than 5 percent of the Minimum Acceptable Bid
7There are several empirical studies on the non-substitutability among licenses due to existence
of synergy e¤ects. See Ausubel, Cramton, McAfee and McMillan (1997), Moreton and Spiller (1998) and
Bajari and Fox (2007).
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Table 6: Jump Bids
PCS-C Block Auction 35 AWS-1 700 MHz
All bids placed 27; 763 19; 798 16; 197 36; 418
Bids= MAB 14236(51:3%) 19575(98:9%) 15957(98:5%) 36408(99:97%)
Bids> MAB 13527(48:7%) 223(1:1%) 240(1:5%) 10(0:03%)
Bids> 5% of MAB 1193(4:3%) 203(1:0%) 186(1:1%) 10(0:03%)
Table 7: Self-bumping bids
Auction PCS-C Block Auction 35 AWS-1 700 MHz
Total bids from round 2 27; 783 18; 893 15; 466 34; 569
Self-bumping bids 567(2:04%) 43(0:23%) 12(0:08%) 265(0:77%)
(MAB). We dene a self bumping bid as a case in which the provisionally winning bidder
increases her own bid in the auction.
Table 6 presents frequencies of jump bids in the four auctions and Table 7 presents frequen-
cies of self-bumping bids.
The results of the tables are quite striking. In the PCS C Block only half of the bids are
equal to the MAB compared to nearly 99 percent of the bids in the other three auctions. Also,
2 percent of the bids are self bumping in the C block compared to less than one percent in the
other auctions. Recall that the 700 MHz had anonymous bidding and click box bidding. AWS-
1 and Auction 35 both had click box bidding. As we discussed in the introduction, click box
bidding restricts the set of available bids and therefore possibly the scope to signal or intimidate
other bidders in the auction. The C Block had neither of these features and economic theory
suggests that there may have been greater scope for colluding with other bidders. This is one
interpretation of Tables 6 and 7. Of course, the C Block had a much larger number of bidders,
many of whom were small. Also, the C Block had no minimum bids. These or other factors
could also be responsible for the part of the di¤erences across Tables 6 and 7.
5.2 Additional tests of straightforward bidding
In this subsection, we describe another test of straightforward bidding. Let i denote license
and r denote a round. Let Si;r denote the package of licenses for which bidder i is the standing
high bidder at the start of round r or that bidder i places a bid on during round r. In other
words, Si;r is the set of licenses on which bidder i was active in round r. Assume that bidder
i has a quasi-linear utility function and let vi(Si;r ) denote is dollar valuation for the licenses
in Si;r: Given a licenses l in Si;r, let pli;r be equal to the minimum acceptable bid on license
l if i is not the high standing bidder. If i is the current high standing bidder at the start of
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round r, let pli;r denote is bid from the previous round. Milgrom (2000) refers to this as the
personalized price of license l for bidder i in round r: Dene Pi;r(Si;t ) =
P
l2Si;t p
l
i;r. This is
the sum of personalized bids for licenses on which i is active.
Suppose bidder i bids straightforwardly throughout the auction and there is no budget
constraint. Let r and r0 be any two rounds in the auction in which bidder i bid. Then, revealed
preference implies that
vi(Si;r )  Pi;r(Si;r )  vi(Si;r0 )  Pi;r(Si;r0 ) (2)
vi(Si;r )  Pi;r0(Si;r )  vi(Si;r0 )  Pi;r0(Si;t0 ) (3)
In (2) the term vi(Si;r )   Pi;r(Si;r ) is is value for Si;r minus the personalized prices that i
faces Si;r. This di¤erence would be is surplus if the auction closed at round r. The term
vi(Si;r0 )  Pi;r(Si;r0 ) is the analogous term from Si;r0, the items that i bid on in round r0. In
words, this means that at personalized prices in round r, Si;r is revealed preferred to Si;r0 : The
second inequality is the analogous expression for round r0:
Adding these two inequalities together yields that
Pi;r(Si;r )  Pi;r(Si;r0 )  Pi;r0(Si;r )  Pi;r0(Si;r0 ): (4)
Note that the inequality (4) does not involve the valuations vi(Si;r ) and vi(Si;r0 ) which are
not directly observed by the economist. Instead, it only involves the personalized prices of the
package of licenses the bidder was active on which we can observe given the bids in the auction.
The inequality (4) is therefore a testable implication of straightforward bidding.
Next, let I(r) denote the set of remaining bidders in round r. Dene
(r) =
P
i2I(r) 1(Pi;r(Si;r )  Pi;r(Si;r 1 )  Pi;r 1(Si;r )  Pi;r 1(Si;r 1 ))1(Si;r 6= Si;r 1)P
i2I(r) 1(Si;r 6= Si;r 1)
Straightforward bidding implies that (r) = 1 for all rounds r: (r) always lies between 0 and
1. It can be interpreted as a measures of the frequency with which the revealed preference
inequalities (2) and (3) implied by straightforward bidding are violated between two adjacent
rounds r and r   1. Next, we display (r) for all rounds in the four auctions in our data set.
Figure 3 shows a very striking result. As the auction rules evolved over time, there was
a high frequency of rounds in which (r) was close to one. In the C Block auction, (r) was
signicantly less than one in almost all rounds before round 93 of the 183 round auction. In the
700 MHz auction, (r) is equal to one in most rounds larger than 33. The amount and length
of non-straightforward bidding in auction 35 and the AWS-1 lie between these two extreme
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Figure 3: Revealed Preference with Straightforward Bidding
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points. One interpretation of these graphs is that as the FCC introduced click box and then
anonymous bidding, bids became increasingly straightforward and hence non-collusive.
Obviously, this is not the only interpretation. First,the 700 MHz auction had much larger
rms than the C Block that were bidding at a much later point in time. Therefore the
equilibrium behavior could di¤er in ways that we have failed to control for in these gures.
Second, it is possible that bidders found alternative ways to tacitly collude that were not as
brazen as the examples discussed in Cramton and Schwartz (2002). A nal interpretation
is that no collusion occurred and that our diagnostics for collusion and economic theories of
bidding are woefully inadequate.
It is not possible to rule out any of these alternatives given what is discussed above. How-
ever, the di¤erences in bidding patterns across the auctions are quite striking and do seem
consistent with an interpretation that bidding has become more straightforward as the rules
have evolved.
5.3 Comparison: AWS-1 vs. 700 MHz
Finally, we perform an exercise similar to Cramton and Schwartz (2002) and search for evidence
of retaliatory bids. We say that bidder j bumped bidder i from license l if j replaced i as the
high bidder in a round: The idea behind retaliatory bidding is that once bumped, i will run up
the bid on a license l0: Bidder i s motive for bidding on l0 is to discourage j from continuing
to bid on l:
For a bid to be a retaliatory bid, we require a clear possible motive. The criteria we consider
are:
i) The challenged bidder j bumped the retaliating bidder i from some license l in the two
rounds prior to round r.
ii) Bidder i is not interested in winning l0. That is, the retaliating bidder i has never
submitted a bid for l0 that is not a retaliatory bid in a round prior to r in which he
bumped j.
iii) Bidder js interest in l0 should be clear to bidder i. Bidder j submitted bids on l0 for
at least twice in prior rounds or j has been a standing high bidder for the previous ten
rounds.
iv) Bidder is signal should be clear to j: there is only one j and one l0 that meets i) to iii).
Obviously, there are many ways to dene a retaliatory bid. Conditions i) through iv)
contain features that we believe are intuitively sensible. In addition, we will also consider the
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Table 8: Retaliatory bids in AWS-1 and 700MHz
AWS-1 700 MHz
i) to iii) 317 bouts 275 bout
i) to iv) 136 bouts 78 bouts
i) to v) 103 bouts 67 bouts
i) to vi) 38 bouts 17 bouts
following criteria in order to be conservative in our denition of retaliation. In particular, we
eliminate a bid returned by the above conditions if
v) The retaliating bidder did not consistently adhere to a punishment strategy : although j
keeps bidding on l, i stops bidding on l0
vi) There is a round after round r in which i bid on l0 and j did not bid on l
Table 8 summarizes the number of bouts of retaliatory bidding were observed in the AWS-1
and 700 MHz auctions. A bout is a set of bids with distinctive retaliator(i), retaliatee(j), con-
tested license(l), a license used as a messenger (l0). We count the bouts using various criterion
in order to exam the sensitivity of our conclusions to alternative denitions of retaliation.
Recall that the 700 MHz auction had anonymous bidding while AWS-1 did not. Obviously,
retaliatory bidding is more di¢ cult if there is anonymous bidding since bidder i may have no
idea if he is retaliating against the correct bidder! Also, anonymity makes it more di¢ cult
for i to signal her intentions to j by bidding on l0: Table 8 suggests that there were fewer
retaliatory bids in the 700 MHz auction than in the AWS-1 auction as a result of hiding bidder
identities. Obviously, as we discussed in the previous sections, we cannot consider this as
conclusive evidence of the e¤ect of anonymous bidding on collusion.
6 Conclusion
A long literature in theoretical and empirical economics suggest that collusion can greatly
reduce economic e¢ ciency. Economic theory predicts that one of the main challenges a cartel
faces is to monitor and enforce cartel agreement. Auctions are highly transparent economic
mechanisms. In the PCS C Block, for example, bid amounts, bidder identities and bidder
eligibility were publicly observed during the course of the auction. While auctions have many
advantages, a potential disadvantage is that this transparency facilitates collusion. We concur
with Marshall and Marx (2007) who have argued that collusion is of rst order important in
auction design.
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Since the introduction of spectrum auctions in 1994, the FCC has introduced rule changes
including click box and anonymous bidding that potentially make collusion more di¢ cult.
Click box bidding makes it harder for bidders to directly signal each other. Anonymous
bidding disguises the identity of bidders during the auction, making it di¢ cult, and perhaps
impossible, for the cartel to use the bids to monitor and enforce collusive agreements.
We examined bids from four of the largest spectrum auctions: the PCS C Block, Auction
35, AWS-1 and the 700 MHz auction. We searched for evidence of three types of collusive
strategies: the frequency of jump bids, non-straightforward bids and retaliatory bids. The
evidence suggests that the rule changes introduced by the FCC have made it more di¢ cult for
bidders to collude. In the 700 MHz auction for example, there were fewer retaliatory bids,
jump bids and more straightforward bidding than in earlier auctions. As we have discussed
in the text, there is no fool proof procedure for detecting collusion short of a wiretap or other
physical evidence of explicit cartel agreements. The results we presented are only statistical
and do not constitute proof of tacit or explicit collusion.
At a minimum, we hope that our research will encourage future theorizing and econometric
modeling of the rich dynamics in spectrum auctions. In our opinion, these dynamics are a very
important, if puzzling, component of bidder behavior and have not been adequately explored
in the literature. Improved auction design, including preventing tacit collusion, could benet
greatly from an enhanced understanding of the dynamics of bidder behavior.
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